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ABSTRACT: As one of the most influential comparative philosophers of our time, Henry 
Rosemont, Jr. is known for his unrelenting criticisms against Western libertarian ideas, and 
for advocating ideas derived from classic Confucian thought. One of the criticisms against 
him is that his views are one-sided, and hence unfair to Western libertarian ideas. In this 
paper, I argue that Rosemont’s one-sidedness is deliberate. His theory is not intended to be a 
balanced account.  I will illustrate that Rosemont’s way of conceiving the human self is not 
peculiar to him, but characteristic of those who take philosophy as a way of life, such as 
Mencius and Sartre. I shall argue that their practices suggest a gong-fu perspective, with 
which we evaluate philosophical theories according to their functions in shaping people’s 
behaviors and with consideration of the context of their uses. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
As one of the most influential comparative philosophers of our time, Henry 
Rosemont, Jr. is known for his unrelenting criticisms against Western libertarian 
ideas, and for advocating ideas derived from classic Confucian thought. Like any 
thought-provoking philosophers, his views have triggered enthusiasm as well as 
controversies. One of the criticisms against him is that his views are one-sided, and 
hence unfair to Western libertarian ideas. Some critics complain that Rosemont 
compares the ideal Confucian system of righteous rulers, which seldom existed in 
practice, with the worst consequences in actual practices of liberal ideas. This kind of 
comparison inevitably works to the former’s advantage (Li, 16-17; Svensson 2002, 
57-8). To this, Rosemont had anticipated with a reply: 
 
[P]artisanship does not entail an unbalanced account; on the contrary, one of my major 
purposes in presenting it was to offer a balance to what I regard as ideologically skewed 
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standard accounts, accounts that are all too common in sinological scholarship on 
contemporary China, and in the commercial television and print coverage of the country. 
(Rosemont 1991, 2)  
 
In other words, his one-sidedness is deliberate. His theory is not in itself a balanced 
account but an account provided to achieve a balance for the larger context. It is more 
an action than a pure timeless representation of reality.  
 This raises an interesting question that is both philosophical and meta-
philosophical: what does it mean to do philosophy? Are philosophers supposed to 
explain the world or change the world? Or is the “either/or” way of raising the 
question itself an unfound prejudice that should be rejected in the first place?     
 Without pretending to offer a comprehensive account for the big question, in this 
paper I will take Rosemont’s criticism against the libertarian concept of the human as 
an example and offer some philosophical reflections. I will illustrate that Rosemont’s 
contextualized way of conceiving the human self is not peculiar to him, but 
characteristic of those who take philosophy as a way of life, such as Mencius and 
Sartre. I shall argue that their practices suggest a gong-fu perspective, with which we 
evaluate philosophical theories according to their functions in shaping people’s 
behaviors and with consideration of the context of their uses.  
 
I 
 
Rosemont has long been critical of the libertarian concept of the human being 
understood as right-bearing autonomous rational individual. As early as 1991, he 
stated his basic position clearly:  
 
[T]ere are no disembodied minds, nor autonomous individuals; human relationships 
govern and structure most of our lives, to the point that unless there are at least two 
human beings, there can be no human beings. … [T]he contemporary philosophical and 
social scientific stereotype of a disembodied, purely logical and calculating autonomous 
individual is simply too far removed from what we feel and think human beings to be. 
(Rosemont 1991, 63) 
 
Instead of the individualist concept, Rosemont promotes a Confucian role-based 
concept of person. He argues that we are human beings with concrete bodies in 
specific spatio-temporal locations, which generate impulses, emotions, and attitudes; 
and these inclinations are deeply affected by our social relations and cultural 
traditions. This thick notion of human being is, in his view, much more in accord with 
our intuitions. We come to know each other and encounter each other not as abstract 
individuals but as a specific nexus of social relations. We are so essentially related 
that we don’t just play the roles of being a father, a teacher, a friend, etc. We are 
these roles (Rosemont 1991, 72).  
 Throughout his academic career, Rosemont upheld this view and developed a 
systematic articulation of it. His latest book, Against Individualism (2015), places the 
issue within the context of contemporary philosophy, Western as well as Chinese, and 
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examines the concept of self both in its descriptive and normative dimensions. He 
argues that, descriptively, the libertarian concept of the rational autonomous 
individual self is a concept of a ghost, and taken normatively, it would generate deep 
social problems. In contrast, the Confucian role-based concept of person can serve as 
the foundation for a more sensible global ethics and a human-centered religiousness 
that requires no metaphysics or theology. Unfolding from his initial criticism of the 
libertarian notion of self and promotion of the role-bearing person, we find a 
systematic philosophical theory that covers fundamental issues about metaphysics, 
epistemology, ethics, social and political philosophy, philosophy of language, of 
science, and of religion.     
  Rosemont is not shy in admitting that his view is asymmetrical and one-sided. He 
states clearly that it is his deliberate choice. Consistent with the quote cited from his 
1991 book, he says in his 2015 book,  
 
Throughout I will be arguing against rights-claiming, free and autonomous individuals 
and for role-bearing, interrelated and responsible (thus encumbered) persons. I will of 
course not be altogether fair to the individualist position. But they have had champions in 
excelsis for over two hundred years, and certainly don’t need any assistance from me. 
(Rosemont 2015, xiv) 
 
 Reading Rosemont closely, we find that his choice of one-sidedness rests on 
several considerations. First, it is to counterbalance an existing asymmetry and 
achieve a balance in a larger context, as the above quote indicates. For the past two 
hundred years the Western libertarian position has dominated the world to the degree 
that it has shaped the language of social-political philosophy, which entails tacit 
acceptance of its presuppositions. People can hardly think beyond its vocabulary. To 
counterbalance this dominance is to open up the possibility of thinking beyond the 
box and seeing alternative ways of conceiving ourselves.  
 Certainly it would be unnecessary if the dominant concept is already perfect. 
Rosemont’s another reason for his one-sidedness is that, in his view, the libertarian 
notion of self is seriously flawed, and the Confucian notion of self is much more 
reasonable. This can be approached from two perspectives—descriptive and 
normative. Descriptively, Rosemont argues that the libertarian notion of self is but a 
ghost, for it is an abstraction that is impossible to specify, because once all the 
specifics about me are stripped away, what is left is just an empty indexical “I”. In 
contrast, our relational roles are much more concrete and identifiable through 
experiences, and they represent the way through which we actually identify ourselves 
(e.g. as this teacher, this father, this colleague, etc.). However, as a philosopher who 
is fully aware of the complexities of the issue of self-identity, Rosemont 
acknowledges that, actually   
 
Whether we are ultimately autonomous individuals or co-members of the human community 
is of course not an empirical question, and I know of no conclusive rational argument for 
one or the other, a priori or otherwise. Worse, these differing views are in many ways self-
prophetic; the more we believe ourselves to be essentially autonomous individuals, the more 
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easily we become such. (Rosemont 2001b, 91) 
 
  This leads us to a third reason for his one-sidedness, one that is associated with the 
normative aspect of the individualist concept. Rosemont argues that the libertarian view 
of a free, autonomous rational individual self is “largely responsible for much of the 
malaise increasingly definitive of it” (Rosemont 2001b, 91). Yet, he still acknowledges 
the great contributions of the libertarian notion in the history: 
 
Since this foundational individualism in its differing guises became dominant in the 
early years of the Enlightenment it accomplished a great deal conceptually in justifying 
the American and French Revolutions, and thereby contributed significantly to the 
enhancement of the political, social and creative lives of tens of millions of people 
throughout the Western world for over two centuries. If, as I am maintaining herein, 
foundational individualism is now much more conducive to the justification of 
inequality and oppression rather than justice or liberation—and diminution of 
democracy—for an increasing number of people in the West and elsewhere, at the same 
time I certainly do not want to diminish, disregard or do away with the manifold benefits 
that the grounding concept has brought to humankind during its preeminent period.  
(Rosemont 2015, 60-61) 
 
Today, the overall context has changed. This libertarian notion of self “is now coming 
increasingly to the fore as the growing maldistribution of wealth both within and 
between nations becomes starker,” and the concept of freedom, which is in the same 
concept-cluster, “is complicit in the manifold problems capitalist countries seem 
incapable of dealing with effectively” (Rosemont 2015, 68, 69). This, of course, does 
not exclude the fact that in many contexts of the world, the situation remains such that 
foundational individualism has not lived out of its usefulness.  
 Still another reason for Rosemont’s one-sidedness toward the Chinese Confucian 
view is that, in Rosemont’s observation, there is another asymmetry between the role-
based notion and the individualist notion. It is easier and more natural to get the best 
out of the individual notion from first embracing the role-bearing notion than the 
other way around. In comparing first generation human rights (civil and political 
rights), which are based on the individual notion of self, with second generation 
human rights (social, economic and cultural rights) more in line with the role-bearing 
notion of self, Rosemont says:   
 
By focusing on the free, rational autonomous individual it becomes very difficult to leap 
the chasm that separates the right of free speech form the right of health care, and worse, 
continues to make possible a “blame the victim” rationale for ignoring the plight of the 
less fortunate despite its absurdity, … . 
 
Role-bearing related persons central to the Confucian vision, on the other hand, take 
second-generation rights very seriously, yet do not need to ignore, or even downgrade, 
what the first ten amendments to the Constitution are designed to protect. (Rosemont 
2015, 111) 
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 In addition to all the above, there is one last reason for Rosemont’s one-sidedness. 
Being a Westerner, Rosemont feels a responsibility for being critical of his own 
tradition. Quoting Alasdair MacIntyre, he explains (Rosemont 2001a) his one-sidedness:  
 
[T]he only way to approach a point at which our own standpoint could be vindicated against 
some rival is to understand our own standpoint in a way that renders it from our own point 
of view as problematic as possible and therefore as maximally vulnerable as possible to 
defeat by that rival. (MacIntyre, 1991, 121) 
 
This approach is also quite consistent with Rosemont’s “role-bearing” ethics. In terms 
of moral roles, there is indeed an asymmetry between oneself and others—it is widely 
accepted as a virtue to be strict to oneself and be lenient to others.   
 From the above sketch we can see that Rosemont’s theory is not a flat account 
that aims at laying out an ahistorical and universal truth, but instead, a theory that is 
constructed out of a particular historical context and promoted for the sake of 
correcting a problematic tendency. In this sense his role ethics is actually a contextual 
ethics, and it is a therapeutic action rather than a pure timeless representation of 
reality. It is conducted for the sake of counterbalancing a problematic one-sidedness 
that has long existed in the world as a dominant, if not exclusive, voice, so that we 
can have a healthier approach of life.   
  
II 
 
This contextualized deliberate one-sided way of doing philosophy is not peculiar to 
Rosemont. We may illustrate this through two other theories of human self—
Mencius’ and Sartre’s.   
 Mencius is famous for his theory that human beings are by nature good, because 
humans are all born with the “four hearts” or “four incipient tendencies” – the heart 
of compassion, the heart of shame, the heart of courtesy and modesty, and the heart of 
rights and wrongs. Clearly Mencius is not unaware of the fact that humans are also 
born with selfish tendencies. Why does he not choose the selfish tendencies as human 
nature? The standard answer is that, according to Mencius, the four hearts are what 
distinguishes humans from animals. However, it does not take much effort to discover 
that even this definition of human nature is itself a result of deliberate choice, as one 
can choose to define “human nature” differently. Mencius’ opponent Gao Zi, for 
instance, defines human nature as whatever one is born with, and from there he 
derives his view that human nature is neither good nor evil, and Xun Zi defines 
human nature as what cannot be learned and cannot be acquired by effort, from there 
he derives his view that human nature is evil (see Xun-Zi, 158).  
 Mencius’ deliberate choice to be one-sided in this way is most clearly revealed in 
the following passage:    
 
It is due to our nature that our mouths desire sweet taste, that our eyes desire beautiful 
colors, …. But there is also fate [whether these desires are satisfied or not]. The superior 
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man does not say they are man’s nature [and insist on satisfying them]. The virtue of 
humanity in the relationship between father and son, the virtue of righteousness in the 
relationship between ruler and minister, …— these are [endowed in people in various 
degrees] according to fate. But there is also man’s nature. The superior man does not 
[refrain from practicing them and] say they are matters of fate. (Mencius, 7B/24) 
 
Zhu Xi explains,  
 
These two kinds of tendencies are both in our nature that are given to us by heaven. Yet 
ordinary people take the first five [that our mouths desire sweet taste, etc.] as human 
nature, and when they don’t have the desired objects they insist on having them. They 
take the latter five [The virtue of humanity in the relationship between father and son, etc.] 
as fate, once they don’t have them, they give up. This is why Mencius speaks on what 
needs to be emphasized with regard to each in order to advocate one and discourage the 
other. (Zhu, Meng-Zi-Ji-Zhu-Da-Quan, vol. 14, 23) 
 
In light of this, we see that Mencius is more offering a recommendation of how to 
conceive/construct human identity than providing a pure descriptive theory of what 
our human essence is. In other words, it is more an “ought statement” than an “is 
statement”. The distinction between human and animal is but a contingent fact used to 
make the recommendation. If it just happened to be the case that the distinction 
between humans and animals on this planet was not which possessed the four hearts, 
but which had the ability to lie, Mencius would surely not say that we humans should 
define ourselves accordingly and develop this peculiarity.    
 We may say the same with Sartre’s concept of the human. Contrary to Rosemont, 
Sartre advocates the concept of the human as free, autonomous (though not 
necessarily so rational) individuals. Knowing quite well that such an individual is like 
a “ghost,” hard to grasp with any concrete experience, Sartre bluntly calls it 
“nothingness.” But this nothingness is not literally nothing. It is the possibility of 
making choices. It is “nothingness” in the sense that one’s essence comes only after 
one makes choices. To stress this point, Sartre famously claims, “Man is nothing but 
what he makes of himself” (Sartre 1993, 15). He pushes his point to such a radical 
degree that, he says, “There are no innocent victims.” Even being a victim is the result 
of a choice in the sense that “What happens to me happens through me.” “The worst 
threats which can endanger my person have meaning only in and through my project” 
(Sartre 1993, 53). Because I make the choice of not taking an offense lightly, I am 
responsible for my becoming a victim of the offense. Out of this logic, he makes the 
stunning remark to the victims of the World War II: “We have the war we deserve” 
(Sartre 1993, 53), because “It depended on me that for me and by me this war should not 
exist, and I have decided that it does exist” (Sartre 1993, 55).  
 Taking it descriptively, Sartre’s theory is one-sided and almost absurd. Experience 
tells us too well that we do not get to choose who our parents are, where we are born, 
and what social and economic conditions we grow up with. Sartre’s theory makes 
sense only because he predefined “human being” as choice-maker, and nothing else. 
The logic is similar to define “money” to be U. S. Dollars first, and then claim that 
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money is nothing but U. S. Dollars. But given the fact that people usually under-
estimate the scope in which they can make choices and that people tend to blame their 
social and natural environment for what happens to them, Sartre perceives an 
important need to stress the fact that we humans are different from ordinary objects. 
We can choose who we want to be and define our own lives accordingly. We should 
hold up our subjectivity and take up responsibilities. In order to achieve this, Sartre 
deliberately makes his point through stunning remarks so that people can be shocked 
out of their “bad faith.” One can certainly challenge Sartre by saying, how about the 
innocent children whose lives are devastated by the war? He would say that, so far as 
they can choose to dislike the war, they should not conceive themselves as merely 
passive receivers of the suffering but as active resisters against it. Here, we see also that 
an apparently descriptive theory of human nature turns out to be a normative therapeutic 
action of pushing people toward a proactive and responsible way of life.  
 
III 
 
We may venture to say that no one can be completely free from one-sidedness. The 
difference is usually only a matter of degree and whether one uses it deliberately or 
fall into it unknowingly. Everything is concrete and complex, and once we use 
language to describe a thing we are abstracting certain features out of the complexity 
and simplifying it.  
 We may also venture to say that all philosophical theories may be used to “do 
things,” just as words and sentences can. We may never be able to settle the dispute 
about what a human being is, but all ideas about human being mould our behaviors. 
Different concepts of self are ways of self-conception that, like different styles of 
martial art, each has its own advantages and limitations, although all are not equally 
good. The role-based concept of person allows each member of a society to have a 
clear sense of mutual dependence and to develop a sense of caring for the interest of 
others, but at the same time, it is also likely to breed a sense of privilege. In a role-
based society, people are constantly reminded of their roles, and hence their duties 
and responsibilities, but it can also propagate a sense of social hierarchy and 
inequality among the people. The concept of autonomous rational individual self may 
help one hold up one’s subjectivity and personal integrity, stand firm on one’s own 
judgement and take responsibility for one’s own choices, but it can also breed a self-
centered attitude and impede implementation of social justice and fairness.    
 To borrow an expression from Richard Rorty, such a perspective allows us to 
move beyond the limitation of seeing philosophical theories merely as “mirrors of 
nature” but as “levers.” Under this point of view, theories that are incompatible under 
a descriptive lens may turn out to be complementary, as they may fit for different 
purposes and generate different excellences, along with their respective liabilities and 
limitations, just like different styles of art. Careful analysis of the pros and cons of 
these concepts in different contexts and exploration of the possibility of living a life 
utilizing the conceptually incompatible but practically complementary concepts is 
something that we philosophers inspired by Rosemont should do. 
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  One may be tempted to call this a pragmatic perspective, but I prefer to call it a 
gong-fu perspective instead. Compared to the term “pragma” (πρᾶγµα in its Greek 
origin, meaning “deed” or “act”), the term gong-fu, understood broadly as an art of 
life, as the Song-Ming neo-Confucians took it, is more easily associated with the 
cultivation of the person. After all, how we conceive ourselves is not only a matter of 
choosing what actions to take, but more fundamentally what kind of person to 
become. In this regard, we should be thankful to Rosemont for his observation that 
these conceptions all have the function of “self-fulfilling prophesy” (Rosemont 2015, 
67-8). We can practice deliberate one-sidedness for leading toward better gong-fu.     
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